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Abstract
The common law Rule of Completeness served an important role in Anglo-American
jurisprudence for centuries. Historically, it was a rule guided by principles of fundamental
fairness and was designed to prevent parties from introducing incomplete and misleading
statements at trial.
What was once a simple rule has been muddled by Federal Rule of Evidence 106. The
common law rule language was lost when Rule 106 was drafted, and there is no agreement as to
what portion of the common law survived and what was left behind. Particularly problematic are
the issues of whether Rule 106 applies to oral as well as written statements, and whether Rule
106 allows a court to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence. The federal and state courts are
split on these issues, and the United States Supreme Court has failed to provide guidance.
This Article critically examines current Rule of Completeness jurisprudence. It compares
and contrasts the common law with Rule 106, and then dives deeply into the disparate
interpretations of the Rule. By using two recent Utah Supreme Court decisions as case studies,
the Article highlights the confusion caused by the incomplete understanding of the Rule and
demonstrates the unfairness that occurs when the Rule is read too narrowly. Finally, it
recommends that the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee fill the leadership void in
this area of Evidence law and draft an expanded Federal Rule of Evidence 106.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]he greatest possibilities of error lie in trusting to a fragment of an utterance without knowing
what the remainder was.”2 — John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence
In May of 2011, James Raphael Sanchez beat his girlfriend to death in an apartment in
Salt Lake County, Utah. He admitted to “punching, slapping, kicking, stomping, grabbing” and
repeatedly strangling the victim to unconsciousness before reviving her.3 Somewhere between
five and nine hours after the fight began, he strangled her for a final time by placing “his forearm
across the front of her neck” and leaning into her.4 She blacked out. After attempts to revive her
failed, Sanchez lay down next to her and fell asleep. When he awoke and found her dead, he
called 911, left the door open for paramedics, and went to a friend’s house.5 There “Sanchez took
off his bloody pants and socks and took a nap.”6
Sanchez admitted to the crime but argued that he was entitled to the benefit of Utah’s
special mitigation statute.7 The jury was instructed that, were it to find that Sanchez had been
under the influence of “extreme emotional distress” and that “a reasonable person facing the
same situation would have reacted in a similar way,”8 it should find Sanchez guilty of
manslaughter rather than murder.9

2

7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2094, at 601 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
State v. Sanchez, 380 P.3d 375, 379, aff'd in part, vacated in part, 422 P.3d 866 (Utah 2018).
4
Supra note 7 at 388.
5
Id.
6
Supra note 7 at 379.
7
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–5–205.5(1)(b) (stating that “special mitigation exists when the actor causes
the death of another … under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse”.
8
Supra note 7 at 387.
9
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–5–205.5(1)(b)(iii).
3

2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3558905

At trial, the prosecution called the investigating detective to the stand. He testified on
direct examination that he interviewed Sanchez after he was arrested, and that Sanchez admitted
to the assault.10 On cross-examination the defense attempted to elicit additional evidence about
the interview in order to prove special mitigation. Sanchez told police that during the attack he
was “‘under extreme emotional distress caused by [the victim] repeatedly telling him that she
was cheating on him with his brother.’ To establish the requisite extreme emotional distress,
Sanchez sought to admit his statement to police that ‘he started fighting with [Victim] because he
thought she was cheating on him with ... his brother.’ He said “this enraged him,” that Victim
“admitted it and she kept saying it,” and “that hurt [his] feelings.”11 The prosecution, however,
objected that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court agreed. Although
Sanchez could have testified to this information himself, he chose not to testify. Sanchez was
ultimately convicted of first-degree murder.12
The prosecution in Sanchez exploited a gap in the Rules of Evidence in order to tell a
somewhat slanted story. Because Sanchez’s out of court hearsay statement was admissible under
Rule 801(d) as the statement of an opposing party when offered by the prosecution, but
inadmissible when offered by Sanchez himself, the prosecution was able to artfully cut portions
of Sanchez’s statements. As a result, Sanchez was forced to choose the lesser of two evils: either
allow the prosecution to present a technically correct but incomplete version of his statement or,
alternatively, surrender his Fifth Amendment rights and testify in order to clarify the record.
The common law recognized the damage caused by incomplete statements and addressed
the problem through the Rule of Completeness. Under that Rule, “[i]n evidencing the tenor of an

10

Supra note 1 at 379.
Supra note 1 at 387–88.
12
Sanchez was also convicted of obstruction of justice.
11
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utterance material or relevant, made in words, whether written or oral, in original or in copy, the
whole of the utterance on a single topic or transaction must be taken together.”13 The states
adopted this broad common law principle into their own rules of evidence early in the nation’s
history, and the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence further built upon that effort when the
principle was codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 106.14 Under Rule 106, “[i]f a party
introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in
fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”15
Although the common law Rule of Completeness and Rule 106 are similar, they vary in
three significant ways. First, Rule 106 omits any reference to oral statements, making it unclear
whether the Rule applies only to written and recorded statements or applies to oral statements as
well. Second, Rule 106 adds a timing component that was not present in the common law rule,
allowing the opposing party to stop the proceedings and demand the immediate introduction of
the remainder of the statement. Finally, Rule 106 fails to address whether a statement must be
independently admissible before a party may invoke Rule 106.
As a result of these gaps in the Rule, a significant split has developed among both state
and federal courts.16 Some jurisdictions interpret Rule 106 narrowly. These jurisdictions refuse to
apply Rule 106 to oral statements. Further, they only apply Rule 106 to written and recorded
statements that are independently admissible. If the missing portion of the statement is

13

WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2 (quoting WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE, 371–379 (3d ed. 1942)).
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5001; see also Harold F. Baker, Completing the Rule of Completeness:
Amending Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 281, 286 & n. 23 (2018) (“Put simply,
Rule 106 evolved from the common law, was adopted as a state rule, and was finally codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.”).
15
FED. R. EVID. 106.
16
See infra Section III.
14
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inadmissible hearsay when offered by the party invoking Rule 106, it remains inadmissible.17
Other jurisdictions treat the Rule as an expansive expression of the common law rule. These
courts apply Rule 106 to both oral and written statements. They also treat Rule 106 as a rule of
admissibility.18 In the midst of this chaos, the United States Supreme Court has stood on the
sidelines.
The purpose of this Article is to propose that the Federal Rules of Evidence Drafting
Committee should redraft Rule 106 and follow those circuits and states that have adopted an
expansive interpretation of the Rule. The Rule of Completeness was intended to apply to all
statements, including those made orally, and to admit evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible for the purpose of correcting the manipulative use of incomplete statements at trial.
As a result, it acted as a counterbalance to a method that trial lawyers have employed for
centuries: “carefully trimming a quotation [so] they could tell the truth but use it like a lie.”19
Section II reviews the history of the common law Rule of Completeness and compares it
to the current embodiment in Rule 106. Section III addresses the current split among circuit and
state courts and explains the reasons for the divergent approaches. Section III particularly
explores how courts deal with two separate issues: (1) whether Rule 106 applies to oral
statements; and (2) whether Rule 106 allows the admission of inadmissible evidence. Section IV
examines two recent Utah Supreme Court decisions, State v. Sanchez and State v. Jones, that
dealt with the interpretation of Rule 106. The two cases serve as case studies and highlight the
need for advisory committee guidance in Rule 106 jurisprudence. Section V proposes
amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 106 that will reflect the purpose of the original

17

See infra Section III.
See infra Section III.
19
21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5072 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database
updated Sept. 2018).
18
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common law rule, while simultaneously ensuring that a broader interpretation will not allow
parties to circumvent other important exclusionary rules of evidence. Section VI concludes with
a discussion of how changes to the rule will ensure greater fairness and justice in the courtroom.

II. HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW RULE OF COMPLETENESS AND ITS EVOLUTION INTO RULE 106

A.

THE COMMON LAW RULE OF COMPLETENESS

The common law Rule of Completeness was “clearly conceded and consciously applied”
in the law of evidence as early as the 1600s.20 The Rule was meant to prevent parties from
introducing incomplete, and therefore misleading, statements.21 The principle behind the Rule
was simple. According to Wigmore, statements, whether written or oral, are attempts to express
ideas.22 To break these ideas into pieces and view each part in isolation “would be to obtain a
false notion of the thought.”23 Because “the presence or absence or change of a single word may
substantially alter the true meaning of even the shortest sentence,”24 “the whole of a verbal
utterance must be taken together”25 in order to prevent injustice and misinterpretation.26
The common law Rule included three main features. First, the principle function of the
doctrine was to allow otherwise inadmissible evidence to be used at trial for the purpose of
completeness.27 This is known as the rule’s “trumping function.”28 Thus, when incomplete and

20

Id. at 604 (“The recognition of the principle, and the reason for it are unquestionable … [it] does no more
than recognize the dictates of good sense and common experience.”).
21
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
22
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 595.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 597.
25
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 604 (emphasis omitted).
26
Id. at 595 (“One part cannot be separated and taken by itself without doing injustice, by producing
misrepresentation.”).
27
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1 (footnote omitted).
28
Id.
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misleading evidence was offered, an opponent had the right to admit the remainder of the
statement without regard to other applicable exclusionary rules.29
Second, the common law Rule applied to “every kind of utterance without distinction.”30
It applied to written and recorded statements, as well as acts, declarations, and conversations.31
The rule’s broad scope reflected a recognition that “[a] misleading oral statement is no less
unfair than a written one.”32
Finally, the majority of courts applying the common law Rule did not permit or require
acceleration under the Rule of Completeness.33 As a result, when one party offered incomplete
and misleading evidence at trial, the adverse party was required to wait until cross-examination
or the party’s own case-in-chief before admitting the remainder of the statement.
While the common law Rule helped ensure a degree of fairness, it also posed a risk of
abuse. Parties were consistently concerned that opponents would use the Rule to circumvent
major exclusionary rules and admit copious amounts of irrelevant and inadmissible evidence in
the name of completeness.34 As a result, the Rule was subject to important qualifications and
exceptions designed to guard against potential abuses.35
First, under the common law, “[n]o utterance irrelevant to the issue is receivable.”36 This
rather obvious limitation ensured that the Rule was used to clarify meaning and correct
distortions, not admit irrelevant evidence—even when that evidence was a part of the same oral

29

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.
7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2113, at 654 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
31
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.
32
United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 674 (D. Md. 2017) (memorandum opinion).
33
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
34
See WIGMORE, supra note 27, at 656.
35
See WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 604.
36
Id. (emphasis omitted).
30
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statement or writing.37
Second, “[n]o more of the remainder of the utterance than concerns the same subject, and
is explanatory of the first part, is receivable.”38 As Wigmore explained, “The whole that is to be
considered is obviously not the whole of a phrase or a paragraph,” but “the whole of the
thought.”39 Judges had significant flexibility and discretion40 to determine what material made up
“the whole of the thought,” particularly when the statement was part of a long or complex
conversation.41
Finally, “[t]he remainder thus received” was permitted only to “aid[] in the construction
of the utterance as a whole[.] It was “not in itself testimony.”42 This principle directly addressed
the fear that a party would use the Rule of Completeness to furtively circumvent other
exclusionary rules, particularly those against hearsay. This was especially a concern in criminal
trials, where a defendant might use the Rule of Completeness to admit his own self-serving
hearsay statements and, thus, avoid taking the stand on his own behalf.43
According to Wigmore, admitting the remainder of the statement for context but not for
substance helped stem these abuses:

37

See e.g., People v. Kent, 287 P.2d 402, 405 (Cal. App. 2d 1955) (“The rule that where part of a
conversation has been shown in testimony the remainder of that conversation may be brought out by the opposing
party, is necessarily subject to the qualification that the court may exclude those portions of the conversation not
relevant to the items thereof which have been introduced.”); Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 340 S.W.2d 110, 112
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (“The rule authorizing the admission of the whole of a conversation where part of it has been
introduced contemplates that the balance of the conversation will be relevant to and explanatory of the portion
already introduced.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 356 (2018) (California has used a codified version of the common law
Rule of Completeness since 1872, and the committee notes to the current version of the Rule clarify that it “only
makes admissible such parts of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing as are relevant to the part thereof
previously given in evidence.”).
38
WIGMORE, supra note 27, at 656 (emphasis omitted).
39
See Wigmore, supra note 1, at 604.
40
See WIGMORE, supra note 27, at 659 & n. 6.
41
See Wigmore, supra note 1, at 604.
42
WIGMORE, supra note 27, at 656 (emphasis omitted).
43
See Baker, supra note 10, at 297–98.
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The remainder of the utterance, regarded as an assertion of the facts contained in
it, is merely a hearsay statement, and as such has no standing. It is considered by
the tribunal merely in order to piece out and interpret the first fragment and
ascertain whether as a whole the sense of the first becomes modified.44

For example, under the common law rule, when the prosecution offered the part of a
defendant’s confession to police officers stating, “I shot the man,” the jury is led to believe the
defendant is a confessed murderer. However, if the defendant was allowed to add the rest of the
phrase, “but I did it out of self-defense,” the effect was to eliminate the distortion created by the
first fragment and provide a complete understanding of the entire phrase. In this situation, the
whole expression showed a confession was made, but it was coupled with an explanation for the
event. However, even if the reference to self-defense was material to the case, the completion
evidence could be used to prove it. It could only be used to give meaning to the shortened
statement. Once the misleading impression was removed, the completing evidence had no further
legal effect.45
These three corollaries function as limits on the broad sweep of the common law Rule of
Completeness but still preserve its purpose: the protection of parties from carefully trimmed
statements that may unfairly mislead the jury and distort the truth.
The common law doctrine, including the Rule of Completeness, was first codified in its
entirety by the influential Field Code in 1850.46 That Code, which was the first unified and
44

WIGMORE, supra note 27, at 659.
Id. at 660.
46
The Field Code, named for its most enthusiastic drafter, David Dudley Field, was a code of civil
procedure that “systematized New York’s procedural law and combined the previously separate systems of common
law and equity.” Following New York’s lead, thirty other American states and territories enacted their own versions
of the code. See Kellen Funk, Equity Without Chancery: The Fusion of Law and Equity in the Field Code of Civil
Procedure, New York 1846–76, 36 J. OF LEGAL HIST. 152, 152–53 (2015).
45
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codified rules of civil procedure, stated:

Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by
one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse
party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act,
declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood
may also be given in evidence.47

This version of the Rule of Completeness served as a model for the Advisory Committee during
the drafting process of Rule 106 for the Federal Rules of Evidence.48

B. AN EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 106

The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975, codified the Rule of Completeness. 49 In
its current state, Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides that “If a party introduces all or part of a
writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any

47
See CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, N.Y. COMMISS’RS ON PRAC. AND PLEADING § 1687, at 704–05 (1850).
Several states, beginning with California in 1872, adopted this Field Code provision of the Rule of Completeness
into their own evidence codes and continue to use it today. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5071 & n. 70; see
also CAL. EVID. CODE § 356 (2018). Besides California, the other states where the Field Code is still in effect are
Oregon, Nebraska, Iowa, and Texas. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.2, n. 9.
48
See FED. R. EVID. 106, Advisory Committee’s Notes (listing California Evidence Code § 356 as a
reference).
49
Rule 106 was proposed in 1972 and adopted under the Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain
Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (In its original form, Rule 106 stated: “When a
writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time
to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.”).
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other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at
the same time.”50 The Advisory Committee based the text on two considerations:: (1) “the
misleading impression created by taking matters out of context”51; and (2) “the inadequacy of
repair work when delayed to a point later in the trial.”52 Since its adoption, Rule 106 has only
been amended twice—in 1987 and 2011—but neither of these changes substantively affected the
rule.53
There are several notable differences between Rule 106 and its common law predecessor.
First, Rule 106 contains an “acceleration clause,” which allows an opponent to require the
immediate introduction of completion evidence when the proponent has offered a truncated
version of a statement.54 The rationale behind this function of the Rule has roots in the common
law Rule of Completeness, which was concerned with abuses of the adversary system.55 Both
versions guard against the damage caused to a party when a misleading half-truth is pulled from
its context.56
Rule 106, however, goes further than the common law. It recognizes that, in some cases,
a false first impression cannot be adequately remedied by a “later, separate reading of the
omitted parts.”57 Distorted impressions, once perceived, “can sometimes linger and work [their]
influence at the subconscious level.”58 A delayed review was, in the view of the Advisory

50

FED. R. EVID. 106.
FED. R. EVID. 106, Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972).
52
Id.
53
Id. (1987 Amendments: “The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.”; 2011
Amendments: The language of the rule was amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them
more understandable and consistent throughout. The changes were purely stylistic.).
54
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
55
Id.
56
See 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 56, at 392 (Kenneth S. Broun ed.,
7th ed. 2013).
57
Id.
58
Id. See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1 for further examples of the danger of delay when
misleading half-statements have been introduced by a proponent:
51
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Committee, a defect in the common law rule. The Committee sought to overcome its ill effects
through the acceleration clause.59 Rule 106 gives the opponent not only the right to complete the
truncated statement, but also grants the “further right to demand that the proponent expand the
scope of his questioning” at the moment the misleading evidence is introduced.60
Second, Rule 106 only applies to incomplete writings and recorded statements, but not to
oral statements.61 This was a purposeful narrowing of the common law rule. The Advisory
Committee provided little detail on its reason for the change, stating only that, “for practical
reasons, the rule … does not apply to conversations.”62
Some courts and legal academics theorized that the Advisory Committee was trying to
limit the problems caused by extensive oral statements with no clearly delineated beginning or
end.63 As Wigmore noted, “oral utterances are not marked off as distinct wholes in the way that
written utterances are. It is simple enough to see that one letter or one deed ends at the signatures
… but oral utterances can usually not be given any such separate unity of character ….”64
Moreover, oral statements are often heard by multiple witnesses, each of whom hear or
remember one piece of the whole and discard the rest.65 The Advisory Committee may have also
worried that sorting through these complications under the time pressure exerted by the

The opponent may suffer prejudice from the delay because the jury's evolving view of the
case may have already been tainted by the time they hear the completing material. The jury
may, of course, find it difficult to erase from its collective mind the misleading impression
conveyed by the truncated version. But an equally grave risk of delayed completeness is that
the jurors may recognize that the corrected version of the evidence may require them to go
back and undo all the thinking they have done using the truncated version and evade that
onerous task by giving the completing evidence less than the weight it deserves.
59
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
60
See MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 393.
61
See FED. R. EVID. 106.
62
FED. R. EVID. 106 Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972).
63
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
64
7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2099, at 619 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
65
Id.
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acceleration clause would disrupt the proponent’s case.66
Third, the newly-enacted Rule 106 only allows a party to introduce completeness
evidence when that evidence ought “in fairness . . . to be considered at the same time.”67 The
common law version, conversely, allowed the introduction of completeness evidence “necessary
to make [the incomplete evidence] understood.”68 This change in language provided trial judges
with flexibility that they, up to that point, had not enjoyed. The common law Rule had developed
into a rigid rule in which trial judges had little discretion.69 For example, if a party introduced
one of a series of letters, the opposing party could automatically introduce the entire series on the
same topic.70 The Advisory Committee intended to give judges more latitude than the common
law allowed and used the fairness standard to achieve that goal.71 Now, no evidence is
automatically admissible under Rule 106.72 However, the change in phrasing also injected a
“morally tinged and discretionary standard” into Rule 106 analysis, giving trial court judges
significant leeway to determine what is required by “fairness.”73
Fourth, Rule 106 is not an exclusionary rule.74 It does not give a party the power to
prevent an opponent “from introducing an incomplete statement; it only gives the power to
require that the statement be completed or to complete it himself.”75 Courts may not exclude
information that may be material to a case, but also must provide a remedy when that evidence is

66

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
See FED. R. EVID. 106.
68
CAL. EVID. CODE § 356 (2018); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
69
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5077.
70
See id. (footnote omitted) (This is but one example of many automatic admissibility rules under the
common law Rule of Completeness.).
71
See id.
72
See id.
73
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
74
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.
75
Id.
67
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manipulated to create a misleading impression.76
Finally, Rule 106, unlike the common law Rule, is silent on the issue of admissibility.
The drafters did not address whether Rule 106 allows completion evidence only if it would
otherwise be independently admissible;77 or if, conversely, it functions as a rule of admissibility,
allowing competition evidence that would ordinarily be barred by another rule. This silence
created both a state and federal court split on the issue.

C. HAS RULE 106 REPEALED AND REPLACED THE COMMON LAW RULE OF COMPLETENESS?

Although the Advisory Committee notes say nothing about admissibility, many courts
refuse to admit evidence under the Rule of Completeness when that evidence is prohibited by
other exclusionary rules.78 These courts, along with many state drafters and evidence scholars,
believe that the only intended function of Rule 106 was “altering the order of proof to accelerate
completeness.”79 As such, they believe the drafters of the Rule “must have abandoned the
principle function of the common law completeness doctrine—allowing inadmissible evidence to
be used for completion.”80
However, other state drafters and courts believe this reading of the Rule makes it “largely
ineffectual in exactly those kinds of egregious abuse that spawned the common law
completeness doctrine.”81 As a result, these courts continue to follow the spirit of the common
law Rule, using Rule 106 as a rule of admissibility.

76

Id.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
78
See infra Section III.
79
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
80
Id.
81
Id.
77
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These dueling interpretations of Rule 106 lead to further and ongoing questions: (1) is
Rule 106 solely a rule that controls the timing of completeness evidence; and (2) if Rule 106
dropped the principle “trumping function” of the common law Rule of Completeness, did it also
repeal the common law doctrine altogether, thus banning the introduction of otherwise
admissible evidence previously allowed under the common law rule?82 Many lower courts, state
drafters, and evidence writers reached divergent positions regarding these questions.83
The Supreme Court briefly waded into the disagreement surrounding the application of
Rule 106 in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.84 In Beech Aircraft, a Navy training aircraft crashed,
claiming the lives of a Navy flight instructor and her student pilot.85 Following the crash, the two
pilots’ surviving spouses sued the plane’s manufacturer, claiming the crash was caused by a
defect in the aircraft’s fuel control system.86 The manufacturer denied responsibility and instead
claimed the reason for the crash was pilot error.87
In the weeks following the accident, the Navy produced a JAG investigative report. The
deceased flight instructor’s spouse, who was himself also a Navy flight instructor, took issue
with the report and88 wrote a letter to the investigator outlining his own theory of the accident.89
In that letter he both challenged the JAG report’s conclusions and included a detailed explanation
of how mechanical failure caused the crash.90
Although the letter was hearsay, it was admissible when introduced at trial by the
manufacturer as a statement of an opposing party under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). The

82

See id.
Id. at § 5072.1 & nn.68–73.
84
488 U.S. 153 (1988).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 156–157.
87
Id. at 157.
88
Id. at 159.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 170–171.
83
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manufacturer therefore called the spouse as an adverse witness and introduced two portions of
the letter. The first was a statement that the deceased flight instructor had attempted to cancel the
flight the morning of the crash because of her student’s fatigue.91 The second was a statement
that, due to their own error, the two pilots were forced to initiate an abrupt maneuver when
another plane unexpectedly came into view.92 The spouse, who believed that the two admitted
statements were taken out of context, attempted to correct any misrepresentation during crossexamination. The manufacturer objected. Somewhat surprisingly, the objection was not based on
Rule 106, but rather that the question improperly asked for an opinion. The trial court sustained
the objection, and the rest of the letter was excluded.93
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, inter alia, whether the trial court erred
in refusing to permit Rainey to present a more complete picture of what he had written[.]”94
Despite possible preservation issues, the Court addressed the applicability of Rule 106. It had
“no doubt that the jury was given a distorted and prejudicial impression” of the letter, and had
the letter been read in its entirety, the jury would have seen that its true purpose was to propose
that the accident was the result of a power failure.95 The Court also explained,

The common-law “rule of completeness,” which underlies Federal Rule of
Evidence 106, was designed to prevent exactly this type of prejudice … [i]n
proposing Rule 106, the Advisory Committee stressed that it ‘does not in any way
circumscribe the right of the adversary to develop the matter on cross-

91

Id. at 171.
Id.
93
Id. at 160.
94
Id. at 170.
95
Id.
92
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examination or as part of his own case.’ We take this to be a reaffirmation of the
obvious: that when one party has made use of a portion of a document, such that
misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through presentation of
another portion, the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant and
therefore admissible under Rules 401 and 402.96

The Court further acknowledged that “the Federal Rules of Evidence have partially codified the
doctrine of completeness in Rule 106.”97 Even though the concerns underlying the rule were
clearly relevant in this case, the rule itself was not applicable, so the matter was resolved under
the general rules of relevancy. The Court then explained it “need go no further in exploring the
scope and meaning of Rule 106.98 And thus ended the Supreme Court’s one-and-only glance into
the controversy swirling around Rule 106 and its common law predecessor.
The majority of courts believe the Beech decision resolved the question of whether the
common law Rule of Completeness survived the adoption of Rule 10699, holding that Rule 106 is
a “complement” to the common law completeness doctrine.100 “The reason is that, as the
Supreme Court itself appears to have recognized, Rule 106 only partially codifies the common
law doctrine of completeness, and for situations beyond the reach of Rule 106, the common law
still applies.”101 The Alabama Rules of Evidence go so far as to say that Rule 106 “constitutes a

96

Id. at 171–72 (citation omitted).
Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
98
Id.
99
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
100
Id. at § 5072.1 & n. 19.
101
United States v. Bailey, 322 F.Supp. 3d 661, 670 (D. Md. 2017) (memorandum opinion). See also U.S.
v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 734 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The rule of completeness is a common law doctrine partially
codified in Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”); U.S. v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The
common-law doctrine of completeness has been partially codified in Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”);
State v. Leleae, 993 P.2d 232, 242 (Utah App. 1999) (“The common law rule of completeness … is now partially
found in Utah Rule of Evidence 106.”).
97
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specialized application of the common law completeness doctrine.”102
Many legal scholars also take the position that the common law Rule of Completeness is
alive and well.103 The writers of the Federal Practice and Procedure Treatise on Evidence, Wright
& Graham, stated, “While the decision can be read more narrowly … we think the Court
impliedly held that Rule 106 does not repeal the common law completeness doctrine.”104
McCormick on Evidence further explains that when the Court indicated Rule 106 only “partially
codified” the completeness doctrine, the implication was “that the uncodified aspect of the
doctrine is still in effect in federal court.”105
McCormick’s view is especially persuasive when considering the Advisory Committee’s
Notes to Rule 106. The notes list §56 of McCormick’s evidence treaty, which is the location of
the previous quote, as a reference for the rule.106 Moreover, the notes describe Rule 106 as “an
expression of the rule of completeness.”107 This is not the kind of clear language one would
expect if Rule 106 were meant to displace the common law.
Although it seems the Supreme Court indicated in the Beech case that the common law
Rule of Completeness is still applicable when evidence falls outside the scope of Rule 106, the
Court did not follow its own suggestion. Rather than reach its decision through a completeness
analysis, it arrived at its conclusion via relevance instead.108 The Court, therefore, gave no

102
Ala. R. Evid. 106, Advisory Committee’s Notes (The notes further explain that “[t]his rule is not
intended to affect preexisting Alabama applications of the completeness doctrine that lie outside the confines of
Rule 106,” and then lists several examples of when the common law completeness doctrine should be applied rather
than Rule 106.).
103
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.1.
104
Id. See also Baker, supra note 10, at 288 (“[I]t should be noted that Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey
suggests that the common-law Rule of Completeness is not dead; rather, it remains as a counterpart to the codified
rule.”).
105
MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 392–93, n. 5.
106
FED. R. EVID. 106, Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972).
107
Id. (emphasis added).
108
See Baker, supra note 10, at 288, n. 37.
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indication of when the common law doctrine may be used in lieu of Rule 106 or to what extent
the common law rule still exists.109 This ambiguity has led to a wide divergence of interpretation
among the federal circuits and state courts.

III. THE INTERPRETATION OF RULE 106 SPLITS THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS AND THE STATES

Not only has the United States Supreme Court failed to provide guidance on the meaning
of Rule 106, but the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee has also declined to
consider the problem.110 As early as 1997, the Committee recognized the split of authority
among the circuits, yet declined to address the issue.111 Since that time, the split has only grown
and encompasses more questions.112 At a meeting on October 18, 2002, the Committee
considered two issues related to Rule 106: (1) whether the scope of Rule 106 should be extended
to cover oral statements and acts; and (2) whether the Rule should explicitly include a “trumping
function,” which would allow otherwise inadmissible evidence to be offered for the purpose of
completion.113
Following further discussion, the Committee declined to amend the Rule on the grounds
“that the costs of amending Rule 106 … were far outweighed by the risks that a change in
language would be misinterpreted, and concluded that any problems under the current rule were

109

Id.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5071, Proposals to Amend Rule 106.
111
See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of Meeting of April 14–15, 1997, at 10 (The
Committee discussed the split between the circuits on the issue of whether Rule 106 allows inadmissible evidence to
be used for completion purposes.).
112
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5071, Proposals to Amend Rule 106 (explaining the committee
was made aware that “despite the limitation in Rule 106 to written statements, many courts had required
completeness in oral statements … [and] some courts had used Rule 106 as ‘a de facto hearsay exception.’)
(footnotes omitted).
113
See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of Meeting of October 18, 2002, at 3.
110
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being well-handled by the courts.”114 The result has been a jumble of conflicting interpretations
and application. The federal circuit courts remain in conflict, and the state courts, which are not
bound by the federal circuits on this issue115, often ignore the views of local federal courts and
forge their own path.116 There are even examples of conflicts within individual circuits and
states.117
This section will address these conflicting opinions, beginning with the issue of whether
Rule 106 applies to oral statements and how both the federal circuits and state courts view the
matter. It will also discuss the reasoning behind various positions and explain how Rule 106
interacts with Rule 611(a). This section will then look at the difficult problem of whether
otherwise inadmissible evidence should be allowed for the purpose of completion evidence and
analyze the split of authority at both the federal and state levels.

A. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 106 TO ORAL STATEMENTS

Rule 106 is clear that it applies only to writings and recorded statements.118 The Advisory
114

Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of Meeting of April 25, 2003, at 9; see also Andrea N.
Kochert, The Admission of Hearsay Through Rule 106: And Now You Know the Rest of the Story, 46 IND. L. REV.
499, Section III (2013) for a discussion of how a court’s interpretation of Rule 106 has a real impact on cases.
Kochert takes issue with the October 2002 memorandum prepared by the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules, in which he “noted that while the courts appeared to be in a dispute over the existence of a
trumping function, this dispute [did] not appear to make a real difference in the cases.” Kochert offers the example
of United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2009) to disprove this assumption. The rule is not just an
academic problem but a practical one as well, and it needs to be addressed.
115
See infra, Section III.A.2.
116
The classic example of this is California, which did not adopt a version of Rule 106 but instead retained
its own version of the common law Rule of Completeness. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 356 (2018). California’s rule
extends to oral conversations and allows otherwise inadmissible evidence to be considered. Meanwhile, the 9th
Circuit strictly interprets Rule 106 and does not consider oral statements or inadmissible evidence under its doctrine
of completeness. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000).
117
See, e.g., a comparison of the 4th Cir. cases U.S. v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996) and
U.S. v. Gravely 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1988). The two cases, discussed infra, Section III.B.3.a reach
completely opposite conclusions on the applicability of otherwise inadmissible evidence used under Rule 106; see
also infra, Section IV for a discussion of the inconsistent application of Rule 106 by Utah courts.
118
See FED. R. EVID. 106.
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Committee explained that “[f]or practical reasons, the rule is limited … and does not apply to
conversations.”119 Although the Committee had legitimate concerns in mind,120 there are
situations where the truncated use of an oral statement puts a party at a serious disadvantage,
particularly in criminal trials.121 This section will look at where the federal circuit courts and
state courts fall on the issue of the admissibility of oral statements under Rule 106 and examine
the reasoning behind their positions.

(1) Federal Circuit Courts that Allow Oral Statements to be Used as Completion
Evidence

Many federal circuit courts, recognizing that Rule 106 does not permit the admission of
oral statements for completeness, approve the admission of oral completeness statements under
Rule 611(a).122 That provision states, “[t]he court should exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence ….”123 Like the discretion
provided by the common law rule of completeness, Rule 611(a) is designed to “make [the
presentation of evidence] effective for determining truth.”124
At least four circuit have chosen to extend the rule of completeness to oral statements via
Rule 611(a). These include the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.125 For example, the

119

See FED. R. EVID. 106, Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972) (emphasis added).
See discussion of problems associated with admitting oral conversations, supra p. 7, at ¶ 2 & nn.62–67.
121
See U.S. v. Bailey, 322 F.Supp.3d 661, 674 (D. Md. 2017) (memorandum opinion).
122
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5074.1.
123
FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
124
FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(1).
125
See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 579 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that the “short answer
to this claim is that Rule 106 does not apply to testimony about unrecorded oral statements” but also acknowledging
that “the district court retained substantial discretion under Fed.R.Evid. 611(a) to apply the rule of completeness to
oral statements”); United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 727–28 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting, without disagreement, that
other circuits “have held that Rule 611(a) imposes an obligation for conversations similar to what Rule 106 does for
120
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Seventh Circuit held that “by its terms the rule refers to written or recorded statements. However
Rule 611(a) gives the district courts the same authority with respect to oral statements and
testimonial proof.”126 This position is also supported by many evidence commentators, including
McCormick, who posited that “the trial judge appears to have the same power to require the
introduction of remainder of oral conversations under Federal … Rule of Evidence 611(a).”127
The Second Circuit has long held that Rule 611(a) can be used to admit oral
completeness evidence,128 but in a recent decision, it went a step further and explicitly adopted
Wright & Graham’s position129 that oral statements are admissible under the common law rule of
completeness and that the issue should have been put to rest in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.130 That case, at least according to Wright & Graham,
held that the common law completeness doctrine—which is not limited to written or recorded

writings.”); United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 652 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The ‘rule of completeness' allows a party to
correct a misleading impression created by the introduction of part of a writing or conversation by introducing
additional parts of it necessary to put the admitted portions in proper context. This common-law principle was
codified for written statements in Federal Rule of Evidence 106, and ... extended to oral statements through
interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a).”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); United States v.
Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 734 (10th Cir. 2010) (“While Rule 106 applies only to writings and recorded
statements, we have held the rule of completeness embodied in Rule 106 ‘is substantially applicable to oral
testimony, as well by virtue of Fed.R.Evid. 611(a), which obligates the court to make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth.’”) (quoting United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696
(2d Cir. 1994)).).
126
United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993) (The Court then cites several other Seventh
Circuit cases that agree with this position.); see also United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386, 1392 (7th Cir.1992);
United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir.1992).
127
MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 394, n.7; see also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 106.02[3], at 672–73 (11th ed. 2015):
While Rule 106 by its terms applies only to writings and recordings, the principle of
completeness embodied in the rule has been applied to testimony about oral statements as
well (such as a police officer's selective rendition of a defendant's oral statement). Whether
this is mandated by Rule 106 or by Rule 611 is unimportant. The important point is that
where a party introduces a portion of an oral statement, the adversary is entitled to have
omitted portions introduced at the same time, insofar as that is necessary to correct any
misimpression that the initially preferred portion would create.
128
United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1994) (“While Rule 106 applies only to writings,
we have previously explained that the rule of completeness is substantially applicable to oral testimony, as well by
virtue of Fed.R.Evid. 611(a), which obligates the court to make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth.”) (internal quotations omitted).
129
See United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2019).
130
488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988).
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statements—survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rules 106 and
611(a).131 In United States v. Williams, the Second Circuit concluded that, although Rule 106
does not cover oral statements, “the common law rule of completeness is substantially broader
than Rule 106, covering . . . the truncated use of acts, declarations, and conversations . . . [a]nd
as the Supreme Court made clear in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, the common law doctrine
persists in the wake of Rule 106’s adoption.”132 The Second Circuit is the only federal circuit
court to use the common law Rule of Completeness to admit oral statements for completion
purposes.133
Although many federal circuits have adopted the process of using Rule 611(a) to admit
oral testimony for completion purposes, the same principles of relevance and fairness that
constrain the use of Rule 106 apply equally to Rule 611(a). Rule 611(a), like Rule 106, “permits
introduction only of additional material that is relevant and is necessary to qualify, explain, or
place into context the portion already introduced.”134 Further, whether a court is operating under
Rule 106 or 611(a), it must “remain guided by the overarching principle that it is the trial court's
responsibility to exercise common sense and a sense of fairness to protect the rights of the parties
while remaining ever mindful of the court's obligation to protect the interest of society in the
ascertainment of the truth.”135

(2) State Courts that Allow Oral Statements to be Used as Completion Evidence

131

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5074.1.
Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
133
Id. (“This Court has expressly recognized as to oral statements that Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) both ‘empowers
and obligates’ district courts to require ‘a party offering testimony as to an utterance to present fairly the “substance
or effect” and context of that statement,’ just as the common law doctrine requires.” (quoting United States v.
Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1987)).
134
845 F.2d 938, 944 (11th Cir. 1988).
135
United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1987).
132
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Because the completeness doctrine has no constitutional basis, neither Rule 106 nor the
common law rule of completeness are binding on the states.136 Nevertheless, nearly all the states
have some form of the rule, with many simply incorporating the language of Rule 106 into their
own evidence codes.137 Several states, like the majority of federal circuits, allow oral
completeness evidence under Rule 611(a).138
However, variation exists even within this approach. For example, one state court,
although theoretically willing to apply Rule 611(a) to oral evidence, expressed concerns about
the problems inherent in oral statements.139 As the Court correctly pointed out, “oral statements
are not easy to parse[.]”140 It therefore declared that “treating oral statements identically to the
written and recorded statements covered by rule 106 is inappropriate.”141 While “the introduction
of documents under the doctrine of oral completeness should be more narrowly confined than the
introduction of statements under rule 106[,]”142 the appellate court concluded that trial courts
retain discretion to admit these statements. At the same time, it declared that trial courts should
consider a variety of factors, including trustworthiness and reliability, before performing a Rule
611 analysis.143

136

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.2.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5071, State Adoptions.
138
See, e.g., NO. DAK. R. EVID. 106 (“The rule is not a rule of admissibility, but rather one dealing with
order of proof, and as such may be considered to be but a specific application of the general dictates of Rule 611.”);
Schreiber v. State, 973 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (state courts have "interpreted" Rule 106 to
apply to unrecorded oral statements).
139
See State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165, 1168 (Utah 2003).
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 1167–68. The Court went on to explain its view by stating:
The Utah Rules of Evidence are not meant to codify the law of evidence, but to formulate
guides from which the law of evidence can grow and develop. These rules therefore supply a
fresh starting place for the law of evidence and do not present an ultimate end. Despite its
exclusion from rule 106, the rule of oral completeness may assist courts in the growth and
development of the law of evidence and has been invoked by the courts of other states
137
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Other states also march to the beat of their own drum, applying a wide variety of
approaches to the admission of oral evidence.144 Some states rely on the precedent of the
common law Rule of Completeness to allow oral statements.145 Others use a combined approach,
allowing courts to admit oral completeness evidence under the common law and then use Rule
106 to accelerate that completeness.146 One state allows oral statements based on the application
of their own state version of Rule 106,147 while yet another combines Rule 106 with a Rule 403
analysis to determine whether to admit oral statements.148 And for states that adopted the Field
Code version of the completeness doctrine,149 similar to California’s rule, the problem of what to
do about oral evidence never arises because that codification already “applies to oral statements
and acts.”150

through rules similar to our rule 611, which requires trial courts to make the interrogation
and presentation [of evidence] effective for the ascertainment of the truth.
144
For examples of the different approaches the states take in regard to oral evidence, see WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 2, at § 5074.1 & nn.8, 10, 19, 21–24 (citing that Nevada allows oral statements based on the application
of their state version of Rule 106; Florida and Indiana rely on the precedent of the common law Rule of
Completeness to allow oral statements; Maryland and West Virginia use a combined approach, admitting oral
evidence under the common law Rule of Completeness and then using Rule 106 to accelerate that completeness; and
Michigan combines Rule 106 with a Rule 403 analysis to determine whether to admit oral statements).
145
Mississippi’s Rule of Evidence 106 is an exact copy of the federal version, but in the Advisory
Committee’s notes it states, “This rule is a codification of the common law doctrine of completeness … However,
Rule 106 is somewhat narrower than Mississippi common law. The rule only applies … to written or recorded
statements ... Under Mississippi case law the rule of completeness is extended to other writings and even to oral
statements." See MISS. R. EVID. 106, Advisory Committee Notes; see also Whitfield v. State, 933 So.2d 1245, 1248
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (while conceding that the language of Fla. Evid. Code § 90.108(1) suggests the statute
only applies to writings or recorded statements, the court applied Florida precedent applying completeness doctrine
to conversations); Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that the Court has always
held that the common law doctrine of completeness applies to oral conversations as well as writings).
146
Maryland and West Virginia use the combined approach. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5074.1
& nn.21, 23.
147
See Domingues v. State, 917 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1996) (explaining that Nevada allows oral
statements based on the application of their state version of Rule 106).
148
Michigan’s court rules suggest that this is the process Rule 106 analysis would take. See 1 ROBINSON,
LONGHOFER & ANKERS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES PRACTICE: EVIDENCE 88 (2d ed. 2002).
149
These states include California, Oregon, Nebraska, Iowa, Montana, and Texas. See WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 2, at § 5071, State Adoptions.
150
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5074.1.
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(3) Federal Circuit Courts and State Courts that Reject the use of Oral
Statements Under Rule 106

Some state and federal courts, including the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, strictly
enforce the distinction made by Rule 106 between oral statements and their written or recorded
counterparts.151 In some circumstances, this rule has had the unintended consequence of
encouraging police officers to take oral, rather than recorded or written, confessions from
suspects unless they are convinced that the statement will be completely inculpatory.152 Further,
it may encourage prosecutors to rely only on oral testimony, even when written or recorded
evidence is available and admissible. For example, in United States v. Garcia, the Court held that
Rule 106 was not applicable to oral statements, even when an immigration officer testified from
memory about an interrogation he conducted with the defendant. The interrogation was recorded,
but the recording was never submitted as evidence at trial.153 The court denied the defendant’s
request to introduce the recording as completion evidence because the prosecution had not itself
introduced the recorded statements. Rather, the court held that “Rule 106 does not apply to a
witness’s testimony at trial” nor is simply quoting from a transcript tantamount to admittance of
the evidence.154

151

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5074.1 & nn.8, 20, 25 (citing that Alabama rejects oral statements
because its version of Rule 106 does not allow them; Colorado and New Hampshire reject oral statements because
their courts have found that the common law Rule of Completeness did not survive the passage of Rule 106; and
Kentucky prohibits defendants from using the completeness doctrine to require witnesses to include exculpatory
portions of an oral confession).
152
See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he rule of completeness …
applies only to written and recorded statements. Because the officer’s testimony concerned an unrecorded oral
confession, the rule of completeness does not apply.”); United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996)
(The defendant was not allowed to cross-examine an FBI agent about exculpatory statements he allegedly made
because “[t]he rule only applies to writings or recorded statements, not to conversations.”); State v. Thibeault, 621
A.2d 418, 422 (Me. 1993) (raising the concern that if defendants aren’t allowed to complete their oral confessions,
police officers would only record those statements that were completely inculpatory).
153
530 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2008).
154
Id. at 353.
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B. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 106 APPLY TO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD BE OTHERWISE
INADMISSIBLE

The question of admissibility under Rule 106 is complex and disputed.155 Nothing in the
rule’s language, nor in the Advisory Committee’s notes “limits the material used for
completeness to evidence that satisfies the requirements of the other exclusionary rules. Unlike
the Rules that were made subject to other exclusionary doctrines, it does not contain an ‘except
as otherwise provided’ clause.”156 At the same time, nothing in the rule language or notes
explicitly provides for the admission of evidence that would normally be prohibited by another
exclusionary rule.
As a result, Rule 106 can be read in two ways. Either Rule 106 simply governs the timing
of presenting evidence, or it may be treated as retaining the “trumping function” it had under the
common law, which allowed evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under other
exclusionary rules.157 This section will look at where the federal circuit courts and state courts
fall on the issue and examine the reasoning behind their positions.

(1) Federal Circuit Courts and State Courts which Hold that Rule 106 is About
Timing and Nothing Else

155
Unlike the question regarding Rule 106’s applicability to oral statements, Rule 611(a) cannot be used in
this situation. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5072.2 (“Rule 611 does not purport to give the trial judge any
power to admit inadmissible evidence.”).
156
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.1.
157
Id.
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Some courts conclude that Rule 106 “does not compel admission of otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence.”158 Courts that subscribe to this version of the doctrine interpret
the rule as solely governing evidence that would otherwise be admissible under the rules and
“simply allowing for its introduction at a more appropriate time.”159 These courts are primarily
concerned about parties who use Rule 106 to introduce evidence that circumvents major
exclusionary rules,160 particularly criminal defendants who use the rule to introduce
inadmissible, self-serving exculpatory statements – without testifying themselves – under the
cover of completeness.161
For example, a defendant might make oral or recorded statements to the police. Although
hearsay, these statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)162 when offered by the
prosecution at the defendant’s trial.163 These “[a]dmissions by a party-opponent are excluded
from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the
adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule.”164 In other words,
an opposing party’s statement is allowed admittance because “a party opponent is already
present in a proceeding to explain, justify, or even deny an alleged omission.”165 Therefore, if the
prosecution only admits the inculpatory statements made by a defendant to the police, as is often
the case, the defendant has the ability to take the stand and rebut those statements with the
exculpatory statements that were also made. Because the defendant has the ability to counteract

158

U.S. Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1375–76 (2d Cir. 1988).
See Baker, supra note 10, at 297.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 298.
162
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) An opposing party’s statement may be offered against the opposing party at
trial because such statements are not considered hearsay.
163
See FED. R. EVID. 801 Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (d), at (2)(A) (1972 Proposed Rules)
(Stating that “[a] party’s own statement is the classic example of an admission.”).
164
Id. at 801(2).
165
2 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 259, at 295–96 (Kenneth S. Broun ed.,
7th ed. 2013).
159
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these attacks, the courts see no reason for allowing inadmissible evidence to be admitted under
Rule 106.166
A few federal circuits, including the Sixth167 and Ninth168, firmly and consistently hold
that inadmissible evidence is not allowed under Rule 106. In one memorable case from the Sixth
Circuit, the Court acknowledged the unfairness of not allowing completion evidence when the
government significantly and inaccurately cropped the transcribed statements of the defendants
and presented them as evidence at trial.169 Although it agreed “that these examples highlight the
government's unfair presentation of the evidence, this court’s bar against admitting hearsay under
Rule 106 leaves defendants without redress.”170 These circuits see Rule 106 as inflexible in its
application, no matter how egregious the conduct of the party admitting misleading evidence. At
least a dozen states similarly bar the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence for
completeness.171

166

United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 651–52 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Out-of-court statements made by a partyopponent are an exception to the general hearsay rule. This exception reflects that the adversarial process allows the
party-declarant to rebut his or her own admissions by testifying at trial. This hearsay exception does not, however,
extend to a party's attempt to introduce his or her own statements through the testimony of other witnesses.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
167
See United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 652 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he rule of completeness ‘is not
designed to make something admissible that should be excluded.’”) (quoting United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370,
373 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We have determined previously
that Rule 106 covers an order of proof problem; it is not designed to make something admissible that should be
excluded. Right or wrong, this court has acknowledged that … exculpatory hearsay may not come in solely on the
basis of completeness.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
168
See United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996) (adopting Second Circuit rule that “Rule
106 does not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.”) (citation omitted); United States v.
Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 106 does not render admissible otherwise inadmissible
hearsay.”); United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because the officer's testimony concerned
an unrecorded oral confession, the rule of completeness does not apply. Even if the rule of completeness did apply,
exclusion of Ortega's exculpatory statements was proper because these statements would still have constituted
inadmissible hearsay.”).
169
See United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826–27 (6th Cir. 2013).
170
Id. at 827.
171
These states include Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.1 (footnotes omitted).
Oregon is an interesting case because it did not adopt a version of Federal Rule 106 into its evidence code. Instead, it
adopted the Field Code version, which is a complete codification of the common law doctrine adopted in 1850.
However, out of all the states that adopted the Field Code, only Oregon “wrote an explicit prohibition on the use of
inadmissible evidence for completeness into its version of the Field Code.” See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at §
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(2) Federal Circuit Courts and State Courts which Hold that Rule 106 Admits the
Inadmissible

Many courts have rejected the notion that only admissible evidence can be used to
provide completion evidence under Rule 106. The D.C. Circuit issued one of the most influential
opinions on the subject in United States v. Sutton.172 There, the Court recognized the primary
purpose of the rule:
Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of
some otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the
proffered evidence should be considered contemporaneously. A contrary
construction raises the specter of distorted and misleading trials, and creates
difficulties for both litigants and the trial court.173
Sutton considered the structure of Rule 106 and determined that “it is concerned with more than
merely the order of proof.”174 First, Rule 106 is not embedded in Rule 611, which governs the
“Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting Evidence.”175 Rather, it is located in
Article I, “which contains rules that generally restrict the manner of applying the exclusionary

5078.2 & n.8; see also note 45, supra. Although Maryland is included in this list, it is important to note that the
Maryland judiciary holds that only its version of Rule 106 does not allow evidence that is otherwise inadmissible to
be admitted. “However, where the evidence sought to be admitted is not otherwise admissible, the evidence may be
admitted in fairness” under the common law doctrine of verbal completeness. See Otto v. State, 187 A.3d 47, 61
(Md. App. 2018).
172
801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
173
Id. at 1368.
174
Id.
175
See FED. R. EVID. 611.
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rules.”176 Further, Rule 106, unlike every other major rule of evidence,177 does not contain a
proviso referring back to, or deferring to, other rules of evidence. Thus, it does not include the
phrase “except as otherwise provided by these rules.”178 This absence indicates “that the
draftsmen knew of the need to provide for relationships between rules and were familiar with a
technique for doing this.”179 The lack of such a proviso suggests “that Rule 106 should not be so
restrictively construed.”180 Thus, when misleading evidence has been introduced, a trial court can
use its discretion to “permit such limited portions [even if they are otherwise inadmissible] to be
contemporaneously introduced as will remove the distortion that otherwise would accompany the
evidence.”181 This approach, the court recognized, is the most likely to comport with Rule 102,
which requires that the “rules of evidence be construed to secure fairness in administration …
[so] the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”182 Finally, Sutton
concluded that Rule 106’s grounding in “fairness” should also be interpreted to include “the
common-law requirements that the evidence be relevant, and be necessary to qualify or explain
the already introduced evidence allegedly taken out of context.”183

176

Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1368 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (irrelevant evidence), 501 (privileges), 602 (lack of personal knowledge),
613(b) (examining witness concerning prior statement), 704 (opinion on ultimate issue), 802 (hearsay), 806
(credibility of declarant), 901(b)(10) (methods of authentication), 1002 (original writing).
178
Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1368 (footnotes omitted).
179
Id. (footnote omitted).
180
Id. (footnote omitted).
181
Id. at 1369.
182
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 102.
183
Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1369.
177
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Along with the D.C. Circuit, the First,184 Second,185 Third,186 and Tenth Circuits187
support a broad reading of Rule 106 designed to conform with Rule 102,188 with fairness as the
lodestar. A recent Second Circuit opinion held that “when the omitted portion of a statement
[which is otherwise inadmissible] is properly introduced to correct a misleading impression or
place in context that portion already admitted, it is for this very reason admissible for a valid,
nonhearsay purpose: to explain and ensure the fair understanding of the evidence that has
already been introduced.189 Seven states agree,190 while two others occasionally and

184

See United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (First Circuit case law “unambiguously
establishes that the rule of completeness may be invoked to facilitate the introduction of otherwise inadmissible
evidence. Other circuits have held differently, but we adhere to our own precedent.”) (internal citations omitted).
185
Early decisions of the Second Circuit rejected a broad interpretation of Rule 106 and refused to admit
completion evidence that was otherwise inadmissible. See, e.g., United States v. Guevara, 277 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir.
2001) (“Rule 106 does not ‘render admissible evidence that is otherwise inadmissible.’”) (quoting United States v.
Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir. 1983). However, beginning in 2007, the Second Circuit abruptly changed its
position to the opposite viewpoint. See United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven though
a statement may be hearsay, an omitted portion of [the] statement must be placed in evidence if necessary to explain
the omitted portion, to place the admitted portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair and
impartial understanding of the admitted portion.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Subsequent Second
Circuit opinions have all relied on this holding to support a broad interpretation of Rule 106. See United States v.
Kopp, 562 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 85 (2d Cir. 2012); and United States
v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 60 (2d Cir. 2019).
186
See United States v. Green, 694 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting with approval the opinion of
the D.C. Circuit that Rule 106 “permits the introduction of evidence that is otherwise inadmissible under other
Federal Rules.”), aff’d 875 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1989).
187
The Tenth Circuit only recently adopted the position that Rule 106 allows the use of inadmissible
evidence for completeness purposes. As late as 2001 in the case of Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail
Servs., 267 F.3d 1068, 1089–90 (10th Cir. 2001), the Court noted that it was unclear whether Rule 106 could be read
to permit inadmissible hearsay evidence and declined to resolve the issue. However, the court has since adopted a
stronger opinion in favor of a broad application of Rule 106. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716,
735–36 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Even if the fact allocution would be subject to a hearsay objection, that does not block its
use when it is needed to provide context for a statement already admitted.” The Court then cited to the cases of
United States v. Bucci and United States v. Sutton for support of this position.); United States v. Harry, 816 F.3d
1268, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing the inclusion of fairness in the text of Rule 106 and citing to United
States v. Lopez-Medina as precedent. “This fairness principle can override the rule excluding hearsay.”).
188
See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly,
eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining
the truth and securing a just determination.”); For a discussion of how the Rule of Completeness and Rule 106
interact with the interest of finding truth, see generally Collin D. Hatcher, The Whole Truth or Anything But …: How
Fairness, Reliability, and the Rule of Completeness Affect the Jury’s Truth-Seeking Function, 39 Am. J. Trial
Advoc. 683 (Spring 2016).
189
United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 60 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original).
190
These states are Connecticut, Colorado, New Hampshire, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.1. Delaware also recently joined this group of states. See Thompson v. State,
205 A.3d 827, 834 (Del. 2019) (“Rule 106 codifies the common law rule of completeness, and its purpose is to
prevent misleading impressions which often result from taking matters out of context. In certain circumstances, Rule
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inconsistently adopt this analysis.191

(3) Federal Circuits with Conflicting Opinions and New Approaches

Contrary to most federal circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit has been unable to maintain a
consistent stance on the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence for the purposes of
completion. Its caselaw reflects significant contradictions. Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit has
advocated for a different method of dealing with the question of inadmissible evidence
altogether.

(a) The Oscillating Position of the Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit is a Circuit in flux. In United States v. Gravely, the Court held that,
after the defendant introduced prior grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1)(B) of witnesses
who claimed the fifth amendment right not to testify at trial, the government was also entitled to
introduce the omitted portions of their testimony even though the statements admitted under Rule
801(b)(1)(B) were only admissible when offered against the government—the party who had a
prior opportunity and similar motive to develop the former testimony.192 The omitted portions,
while perhaps not admissible standing alone, are admissible as a remainder of a recorded
statement. [Rule] 106 allows an adverse party to introduce any other part of a writing or recorded
106 can render otherwise inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, admissible.”) (internal quotation marks and
footnotes omitted).
191
Florida and Mississippi courts have occasionally allowed the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence for
completion, but there are examples of the opposite position as well, so the ultimate outcome is uncertain. See
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.1 & nn.80–81.
192
840 F.2d 1156, 1163–64 (4th Cir. 1988); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), which creates a hearsay
exception for the former testimony of an unavailable declarant.
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statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously. The rule simply speaks
the obvious notion that parties should not be able to lift selected portions out of context.193
Following Gravely, it seemed that the Fourth Circuit had adopted a broad reading of Rule
106. However, a few years later, in United States v. Wilkerson, the Court made an about-face and
abruptly held that Rule 106 does not “render admissible the evidence which is otherwise
inadmissible under the hearsay rules.”194 In yet another case, United States v. Bollin, the Court
hinted that the Gravely view was not completely abandoned.195 Instead, “[t]he fact that some of
the omitted testimony arguably was exculpatory does not, without more, make it admissible
under the rule of completeness.”196 The Court suggested that if excluded testimony is relevant
and necessary to avoid misleading the jury or place the admitted testimony in context, it may
provide the “something more,” regardless of whether the evidence is independently
admissible.197
In response to this uncertainty, a federal district court judge in the Fourth Circuit issued a
memorandum opinion in United States v. Bailey, which analyzed all aspects of Rule 106
jurisprudence throughout the country and offered suggestions for how the rule should be applied
in the Fourth Circuit.198 The Court explicitly noted the confusion within the circuit and stated
that “until this split in authority has been resolved, a court may allow inadmissible evidence

193

Id. at 1163.
84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526 (4th Cir. 2008)
(“Rule 106 does not … render admissible the evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules.”)
(quoting Wilkerson); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 134 (4th Cir. 2014) (Not only does the Rule of
Completeness not allow otherwise inadmissible evidence, it does not “require the admission of self-serving,
exculpatory statements made by a party which are being sought for admission by that same party.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
195
264 F.3d 391, 414 (4th Cir. 2001) (overruled on other grounds by United States v. Chamberlain, 868
F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2017)).
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
322 F. Supp. 3d 661 (D. Md. 2017) (memorandum opinion).
194
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under the completeness doctrine[.]”199

(b) The Innovative Approach of the Seventh Circuit

Early on, the Seventh Circuit introduced a novel method for dealing with Rule of
Completeness questions. In United States v. LeFevour, the Court held that “[i]f otherwise
inadmissible evidence is necessary to correct a misleading impression, then either it is admissible
for this limited purpose by force of Rule 106, or, if it is inadmissible … the misleading evidence
must be excluded too.”200 Thus, if the opposing party cannot complete the misleading statement,
the proposing party cannot offer it in the first place. This interpretation attempts to reach a
middle ground between the competing views adopted in the other circuits.201
LeFevour reasoned that the only legitimate purpose for admitting otherwise inadmissible
material is “pulling the sting from evidence” that an opposing party seeks to use against the
other.202 This objective is achieved either by excluding the entire statement or admitting the
truncated portion only to correct a misleading impression.203 Following this path allows
misleading evidence to be neutralized without permitting Rule 106 to “override every privilege
and other exclusionary rule of evidence in the legal armamentarium.”204
Although several other courts, including those in the Seventh Circuit,205 have cited
LeFevour as precedent for allowing the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence under Rule 106,

199

Id. at 675–76.
798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986) (internal citation omitted).
201
See Michael A. Hardin, This Space Intentionally Left Blank: What to do When Hearsay and Rule 106
Completeness Collide, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1314–15 (2013).
202
LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 1315.
203
See Hardin, supra note 211.
204
LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 1315.
205
See United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1019 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing LeFevour as precedent for
admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence to correct misleading impressions under Rule 106.)
200
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none have adopted the suggestion that misleading evidence in its entirety should be excluded.206
Thus, LeFevour s remains an interesting anomaly in Rule of Completeness jurisprudence.

(4) Scholarly Work which Argues that Rule 106 Admits the Inadmissible

Many evidence scholars207 also unequivocally embrace the position of a broad
interpretation of Rule 106. For example, McCormick criticizes a literalist reading of the rule:

It is sometimes stated that the additional material may be introduced only if it is
otherwise admissible. However, as a categorical rule, that is unsound. In
particular, the statement is sometimes inaccurate as applied to hearsay law. At
least when the other passage of the writing or statement is so closely connected to
the part the proponent contemplates introducing that it furnishes essential context
for that part, the passage becomes admissible on a nonhearsay theory.208

Wright & Graham agree for a number of reasons.209 First, nothing in the facial language
of Rule 106 “limits the material used for completeness to evidence that satisfies the requirements

206

See Baker, supra note 10, at 301–02 & n.117.
See, e.g., Faust F. Rossi, Evidence: 1999–2000 Survey of New York Law, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 489,
498–99 (2001) In discussing the view that Rule 106 only allows admissible evidence for completion, Rossi stated:
This approach makes little sense. If the explanation required to prevent distortion must be
admissible independent of its corrective function, then the purpose of the rule of
completeness is defeated. Either the explanatory statement is non-hearsay because it is being
offered for the limited purpose of providing context or avoiding distortion or it should be
admitted as a form of rebuttal exception to the rule against hearsay.
See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.1, nn.42 & 44–49 for a list of scholarly evidence writers who take
the position that Rule 106 permits the use of inadmissible evidence for completion purposes.
208
See MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 395–96.
209
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.1.
207
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of the other exclusionary rules.”210 The Advisory Committee’s Note is also silent on the issue,
but it does point to California’s codification of the common law Rule of Completeness as one of
the models for Rule 106.211
Second, when the Advisory Committee first published the Preliminary Draft of Rule 106,
the Justice Department wanted to include the words “which is otherwise admissible” to the
clause describing material used for completion purposes.212 The Advisory Committee rejected
this proposal, as did the Senate Judiciary Committee when the Justice Department appealed to it
for inclusion of the words.213
Third, even though Rule 106 is ambiguous on the point, Rule 102’s requirements of
fairness in administration, ascertainment of truth, and justly determined proceedings seem to
require the use of inadmissible evidence for completeness in some cases.214 As Wright &
Graham stated, “No one has ever explained how these standards would be met by a construction
that would allow a party to present evidence out of context so as to mislead the jury, then assert
an exclusionary rule to keep the other side from exposing his deception.”215
Finally, Rule 102 also encourages the “growth and development of the law of
evidence.”216 To achieve this, it is necessary “to look at the prior law in federal courts to discover
the background against which Rule 106 was drafted.”217 This exercise leads back to the federal
common law Rule of Completeness, which allowed the use of inadmissible evidence to complete
truncated statements.218

210

Id.
Id.; See also FED. R. EVID. Advisory Committee Notes (1972).
212
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078.1.
213
Id.
214
Id.; See also FED. R. EVID. 102.
215
Id.
216
Id.; See also FED. R. EVID. 102.
217
Id.
218
Id.
211
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IV. A CASE STUDY IN CONFUSION: HOW UTAH COURTS HAVE STRUGGLED WITH RULE 106 AND
THE DOCTRINE OF COMPLETENESS

The questions of whether Rule 106 applies to oral statements and makes otherwise
inadmissible evidence admissible under the purposes of completion have stymied many a court
across the nation. Utah provides an excellent case study of courts that have struggled with these
issues.
A. STATE V. JONES

In February of 2004, a young woman was found on the floor of her car stabbed to
death.219 After testing DNA evidence found at the crime scene, police located Michael Jones and
interviewed him in April of 2004.220 Jones told officers that he helped the victim purchase crack
cocaine on the night of her murder but that afterward he had returned to the homeless shelter
where he had been staying and didn’t know anything about the killing.221 The case went cold for
two years.222 After more extensive DNA testing definitively matched Jones’s DNA to DNA
found at the crime scene, Jones was interviewed again in May of 2006,223 arrested, and charged
with the murder.224
At trial, Detective Knighton testified as a witness for the state.225 He described Jones’s

219

State v. Jones, 345 P.3d 1195, 1200–01 (Utah 2015).
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 1201–02.
223
Id. at 1202.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 1209.
220
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2004 interview and then testified extensively about his 2006 interview.226 The 2006 interview,
which had also been videotaped, was much longer, and the police asked more detailed
questions.227 While Detective Knighton testified, copies of the interview transcripts were with
him on the stand, but they were not entered into evidence.228 At one point during his testimony
the detective even read directly from the transcript.229 When the State’s direct examination of
Detective Knighton was finished, defense counsel attempted to introduce the video tape of
Jones’s entire 2006 interview with police.230 The State objected, and the district court ruled that
the video tape was inadmissible hearsay under Rule 801.231 Jones was later found guilty of the
murder.232 Jones appealed and alleged as part of his appeal that the trial court erred by not
admitting the videotape of the full interview.233
The Utah Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining the Utah version of Rule
106.234 The rule “codifies in part the common law ‘rule of completeness,’ which permits
introduction of an otherwise inadmissible statement if the opposing party introduces a portion of
the statement.”235 It thus serves two purposes: (1) it serves a protective function, designed to
prevent a “misleading impression created by taking matters out of context”; and (2) “it
establishes a ‘fairness’ standard that requires “admission of those things that are relevant and
necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced.”236
The Court then went on to address the two threshold issues raised by Jones’s argument.

226

Id.
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 1202.
233
Id. at 1209.
234
Id. at 1210.
235
Id.
236
Id. (footnotes omitted).
227
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First, Mr. Jones argued, and the State conceded, “that rule 106 applies to transcribed oral
statements that are used extensively at trial but are not actually introduced into evidence”; and
second, “the State argue[d] that Mr. Jones’s statements in the second interview constitute[d]
inadmissible hearsay and that rule 106 cannot overcome rule 802’s prohibition against
hearsay.”237 Although noting that the Court had never directly addressed or decided these two
issues,238 the Court determined that it was unnecessary to resolve either of them because the case
failed on the merits.239
The Court explained that “[i]t is the duty of the trial court to determine which portions of
the writing or recording ought in fairness be considered at the same time. This means that a court
need only introduce those portions that, in its discretion, are necessary to qualify, explain, or
place into context the portion already introduced.”240 The Court then reviewed the trial record
and determined that Detective Knighton’s testimony had sufficiently contextualized and
accurately related the statements and substance of the second police interview.241 Therefore,
there had been no distorted or misleading statements that could only be corrected by introducing
the entire video recording of the interview. The trial court had not abused its discretion, and Rule
106 was never triggered in the first place.242
This analysis is consistent with Wigmore’s treatment of the subject of oral utterances.243
Wigmore explained that the “general rule, universally accepted, is … that the substance or effect
of the actual words spoken will suffice, the witness stating this substance as best he can from the
impression left upon his memory. He may give his ‘understanding’ or ‘impression’ as to the net
237

Id.
Id.
239
Id. at 1210–11.
240
Id. at 1211 (internal quotations omitted).
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
See 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2097, at 608–09 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
238
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meaning of the words heard.”244 The rule applies to admissions, conversations, and even
confessions.245 Wigmore’s rule is based on a premise that memory of an oral statement can only
last so long. People are often unable to retain precise words and only remember the general
substance of what was said. However, Wigmore wrote his treatise before the days of video
recorded and digitally transcribed confessions. Now, courts and juries can hear precisely what
was said because it has been preserved as it was originally spoken. Not only is this preferable for
defendants who may be worried about the manipulation of their confessions, but it is also easier
for trial judges to perform a Rule 106 fairness analysis and determine if the truncated statement
has been used in a manipulative and misleading way.
By allowing Detective Knighton to testify in Jones about the oral confession without
requiring that the transcript or the video be admitted, the Court may have inadvertently
encouraged future abuse of the adversary system, giving law enforcement agents an incentive to
avoid admitting the transcript and testifying only to a defendant’s inculpatory statements,
knowing that the exculpatory portions can be hidden under the guise of a later hearsay objection.
Although Detective Knighton provided an accurate summary of the police interview in this case,
there is the potential for abuse in the future.

B. STATE V. SANCHEZ246

As described in the Introduction, Sanchez involved another horrific death of a young
woman, this time at the hands of her boyfriend.247 James Sanchez viciously tortured his girlfriend

244

Id. at 609.
Id.
246
For an in-depth treatment of the facts of this case, see discussion infra Section I.
247
State v. Sanchez, 422 P.3d 866 (Utah 2018).
245
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to death over the course of seven hours.248 Sanchez told detectives in a recorded and transcribed
interview that he had committed the murder, but only because he was under extreme emotional
distress at the time.249 His girlfriend allegedly told him that she was having an affair with his
brother and refused to end the relationship.250 At trial, the State introduced the inculpatory
statements made by Sanchez during the interview through the testimony of a detective, but the
Court excluded Sanchez’s statements about the alleged affair on the grounds that they were selfserving hearsay.251 The jury convicted Sanchez of first-degree murder.252 Sanchez appealed,
claiming that if his statements had been admitted, they “would have supported his claim for a
reduced charge based on special mitigation for extreme emotional distress.”253
The Utah Court of Appeals engaged in a detailed Rule 106 analysis254 and determined
that Sanchez’s statement had been improperly excluded under the rule’s fairness standard.255 The
Court was particularly worried that, because Sanchez did not testify at trial, there was no
evidence of Sanchez’s explanation of the murder.256 The appellate court disagreed with the trial
court’s hearsay analysis, explaining that “[t]here is no legal principle which excludes statements
or conduct of a party solely on the ground they are self-serving. If otherwise admissible, a party
has as much right to his own evidence as to the evidence of any other witness.”257 In fact,
Sanchez’s statement was necessary to “qualify, explain, or place in context the portion of his

248

Id. at 868.
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 869.
253
Id. at 868–69.
254
State v. Sanchez, 380 P.3d 375, 380–385 (Utah App. 2016) vacated by State v. Sanchez, 422 P.3d 866,
870 (Utah 2018).
255
Id.
256
Id. at 381. See also State v. Leleae, 993 P.2d 232, 242–43 (Utah App. 1999) (There the Court found that
the fairness standard did not require admission of a self-serving statement but only because the “defendant had an
adequate opportunity during cross-examination to put the selected portions of his statement in context, and other
testimony supported his version of the events.”).
257
Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 215, 216 (Utah 1983) (per curiam opinion).
249
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confession introduced by the detective’s testimony.”258
The Appeals Court also pointed to Rule 807 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, also known
as the residual exception, which provides that “a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule
against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception” so long
as “admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.”259 Rule
106 can thus operate to create a residual hearsay exception under the bounds of Rule 807 because
“it is difficult to see how a statement that in fairness ought to be considered would not serve the
interests of justice.”260 In sum, the Court concluded “that rule 106 allows the admission of
otherwise inadmissible hearsay if under the fairness standard the evidence should be
considered.”261 However, although the Court concluded that the statement should have been
admitted, the Court found that it was a harmless error because there was no reasonable
probability the jury, having heard the statement, would have decided the case differently.262
The decision was appealed and heard by the Utah Supreme Court.263 The court began
with a necessary threshold question: “Does the evidence to be admitted qualify as a writing or
recorded statement under rule 106?”264 Somewhat surprisingly, neither party briefed this
question, and the Court felt that it could not properly answer it either.265 The problem, the Court
explained, was neither party introduced the actual transcript of the detective’s interview with

258

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
UTAH R. EVID. 807 & 807(a). (The Advisory Committee Notes state that this rule is the federal rule,
verbatim. Meaning, this same reasoning that completeness evidence is a residual exception to the hearsay rules
could also be applied at the federal level.).
260
See Sanchez, 380 P.3d 375, at 384.
261
Id. at 382.
262
Id. at 388.
263
State v. Sanchez, 422 P.3d 866, 870 (Utah 2018) (“The court of appeals held that the trial court should
have admitted the evidence under rule 106, but that the error was harmless. Mr. Sanchez appealed the harmless error
determination. The state cross-appealed the rule 106 decision.”) (internal citation omitted).
264
Id. at 872.
265
Id.
259
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Sanchez into evidence at trial, which would have undoubtedly made it a recorded statement
subject to Rule 106.266 While the detective was on the stand, he testified extensively about his
conversation with Sanchez and used the transcript on multiple occasions to refresh his memory
under Rule 612,267 but the transcript was never admitted.268 Further, it was unclear from the
record whether the prosecution or the detective ever directly quoted from the transcript during
the detective’s testimony.269 As a result, the Court was unable to determine how extensively the
transcript had been used.270 The Court pointed out it had “previously left open the question of
whether ‘rule 106 applies to transcribed oral statements that are used extensively at trial but are
not actually introduced into evidence’ … and it certainly left open the question … if transcribed
oral statements are not used extensively at trial.”271
Because the extent of the transcript’s use at trial was a mystery, and the threshold
applicability of Rule 106 remained in serious doubt, the Court declared that it “need not reach
the issues of whether rule 106 would apply to the prosecution’s use of the transcript or require
the admission of statements that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay.”272 The Court
acknowledged the importance of the admissibility question of Rule 106 evidence but found it
unnecessary to decide the issue because any potential error in the case was harmless.273 Thus, the
Utah Supreme Court vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals decision that concerned Rule
106.274 And with that, Utah’s stance on the Rule of Completeness remained an open question.
This constrained interpretation of Rule 106 may have unintended consequences. It
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encourages prosecutors to abuse the adversary system by not admitting transcripts of police
interviews into evidence. Law enforcement officials may take the stand, testify about all the
inculpatory statements they remember the defendant making, and remain safe in the knowledge
that the exculpatory statements are hidden away in an unreachable transcript.275 The Utah
Supreme Court in Sanchez noted that, because the detective used the transcript to refresh his
memory on the stand, Sanchez was provided with specific options under Rule 612(b) that he
could have employed including the ability “to introduce in evidence any portion [of the writing]
that relates to the witness’s testimony.276 While this may have been true in Sanchez, this
suggestion has only taught prosecutors in future cases to ensure their witness’s memory need not
be refreshed before taking the stand.
Because both Jones and Sanchez involved grisly murders, unsympathetic defendants, and
procedural complications, neither was the ideal vehicle for a full analysis of Rule 106. However,
the problems typified by these two cases are likely to be replicated in later cases, not just in Utah
but nationwide. Thus, the Federal Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence is the most
appropriate and expeditious venue for a revision of the Rule.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING RULE 106

In its current embodiment, Federal Rule of Evidence 106 only applies to a “writing or
recorded statement.”277 This language should be changed to include oral statements as well.
275

A defendant may not rely upon their own use of the transcript to trigger admissibility under Rule 106.
UTAH R. EVID. 106 only allows “an adverse party [to] require the introduction” of a writing or recorded statement
when “a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement.” (emphasis added).
276
See Utah R. Evid 612(a) & 612(b) (“[W]hen a witness uses a writing to refresh memory … [a]n adverse
party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness about it, and
to introduce in evidence any portion that relates to the witness's testimony.
277
UTAH R. EVID. 106.
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While courts are right to be wary of the problems caused by oral evidence,278 the Advisory
Committee could mitigate these issues with a careful explanation of how the process concerning
oral statements would work.279 When oral evidence is offered for completeness, it should face
greater scrutiny than written or recorded statements. Trial courts would retain broad discretion to
consider factors such as trustworthiness and reliability; keeping in mind, however, that while
“some oral statements are disputed and difficult to prove, others are not.”280
For example, recorded confessions given to law enforcement officers, summarized
confessions transcribed in officers’ notes, or oral statements that were witnessed by multiple
people would all qualify as oral statements with a high indicia of reliability. Thus, a trial court
could admit the evidence for the purpose of completion. While the desire to avoid “he said, she
said” disputes is a legitimate concern for trial courts, those concerns do not justify creating a
blanket prohibition against oral statements.281 Such a comprehensive ban is unwarranted, and it
invites abuse.282
Further, Rule 106 should be extended to allow otherwise inadmissible evidence to be
admitted solely on the grounds of completing a misleading statement or placing it within its
necessary context. To prevent any abuse that might occur under this expanded application, the
Advisory Committee should set parameters, carefully circumscribing this right and ensuring
proper application of the “fairness” requirement embodied in the rule language.
First, the doctrine of completeness embodied in Rule 106 should not be triggered unless a
truncated statement has been introduced that creates a misleading impression. The otherwise
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See discussion, supra Section III.A.2.
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inadmissible evidence used for completion must be not only relevant but essential to clarifying or
explaining the previously admitted statement.
Second, parties must be prepared to show with some precision how the incomplete
evidence has been taken out of context and in what way it is misleading. Judges would not have
to take a party’s assertions at face value.283 In fact, under Rule 104(c), the court could conduct a
preliminary hearing to consider the evidence and determine its admissibility for completion
purposes.284 For example, in United States v. Soures, the Third Circuit created a four-part test to
determine when remainder evidence “ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously” with
its truncated portion.285 Under that test, once it has been established that only a part of a
statement has been introduced, the trial court must then consider whether the remainder evidence
“is necessary to (1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in context, (3)
avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and impartial understanding.”286 If the
Advisory Committee embraced this test, it would assist trial court judges in making
determinations on Rule 106 evidence and would create precedents that were clear and consistent.
Third, a trial court should be especially receptive to Rule 106 completion evidence when
it implicates a party’s constitutional rights.287 This happens most often in criminal cases where

283

Id. at 668.
See UTAH R. EVID. 102 (“The court must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question so that the jury
cannot hear it if: … the hearing involves the admissibility of a confession; … or justice so requires.”).
285
736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984). Many other courts have adopted the four-part test as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1474–75 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716,
735 (10th Cir. 2010).
286
Soures, 736 F.2d at 91. Beyond this initial test, Wright & Graham have identified additional factors that
can also help courts identify when completion evidence should be permitted under the fairness doctrine of Rule 106:
(1) Can the misleading impression be dispelled by other means?; (2) How much evidence is
needed to dispel the misleading effect?; (3) How strong is the evidence admitted and
omitted?; (4) How long will repair be delayed if not accelerated?; (5) What is the
consequential fact to be proved?; (6) How much will completion disrupt or prejudice
proponent?; and (7) What part did counsel play in truncating the evidence?
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5077.2.
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See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5077.2.
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the prosecution introduces evidence, usually the defendant’s own confession, that can only be
effectively rebutted by the defendant taking the stand and waiving his or her constitutional right
not to testify.288 “A criminal defendant should not be forced to choose between leaving the
government’s distorted presentation unanswered and surrendering” his or her Fifth Amendment
right.289 This situation clearly frustrates the principle of fairness explicitly stated in the language
of Rule 106. Several courts have adopted this rationale as part of the fairness inquiry when
deciding whether to allow otherwise inadmissible evidence,290 and the Federal Rules should do
the same.
Fourth, material admitted for completeness under Rule 106 should not be used as
substantive evidence. To ensure this directive is followed, courts must issue a limiting instruction
and direct the jury that the completion evidence may only be used to give meaning to the
truncated statement and not for the truth of the matter asserted.291 Many evidence scholars and
courts also embrace this position.292 It addresses the fear that parties will take advantage of Rule
106 to make an end-run around other exclusionary rules and admit testimony evidence in the
name of completion.
These recommendations, if adopted, will help guide and unify federal courts’
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See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself …”).
289
See Baker, supra note 10, at 305 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
290
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5077.2; see also United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 85 n. 6 (2d
Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 1981)):
[W]hen the government offers in evidence a defendant's confession and in confessing the
defendant has also made exculpatory statements that the government seeks to omit, the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights may be implicated. In such circumstances … the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent is violated when the omission “paint(s) a distorted picture
... which (the defendant is) powerless to remedy without taking the stand.
291
See UTAH R. EVID. 105 (“If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a
purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”).
292
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 5078; see also Churchfield v. State, 769 A.2d 313, 327 (Md. App.
2001) (“remainder is received as an aid in construction of the utterance as a whole and is not in itself testimony”).
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completeness jurisprudence.

VI. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of completeness, a centuries-old stalwart of Anglo-American jurisprudence,
now partially enshrined in the Federal Rules of Evidence, is one tool designed to ensure that the
American judicial system achieves the grand ideals of truth, justice, and fairness. However, this
goal cannot be realized if parties to a dispute are allowed to unfairly manipulate the adversarial
process. Taking an opponent’s statements and mining them for only a few choice words and
phrases, while attempting to exclude the rest, is an underhanded scheme that does not serve the
interests of justice.
The common law Rule of Completeness guarded against such abuses with a broad policy
of admitting evidence that was necessary to correct a misleading impression. Federal Rule of
Evidence 106 followed in the common law’s footsteps. However, in its zeal to correct the
common law’s shortcoming by adding an acceleration clause, the assurance of protection against
truncated statements was somehow lost in translation. It is time for the Federal Rules of
Evidence to reclaim two important pieces of the completeness puzzle: (1) oral statements and (2)
otherwise inadmissible evidence used for the purpose of completion. If fairness is the goal of
Rule 106, it cannot be fully achieved until the modern completeness doctrine more closely
resembles its common law predecessor.
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